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Abstract 
The Indian Ocean appeared large within the context of superpower rivalry in the Indian 
Ocean during the Cold War, especially after Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and its entry into the 
warm waters of Indian Ocean. The prophecy of Alfred Thayer Mahan an American naval strategist 
is becoming a reality, “Whoever controls the Indian Ocean dominates the Asia. In the 21st century 
the destiny of world will be decided on waters”. The European powers, after Second World War 
gradually gave up most of their territories in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). Even though, Britain 
and France maintained a modest but notable colonial presence in the Indian Ocean. Whereas  with 
the coming up of Cold War between U.S. and Soviet Union, new comers on the scene, gradually ap-
peared with their naval forces and imposed their geopolitical, geostrategic and geo-economic weight 
on littoral powers in the Indian Ocean. It is in the context of binary division of cold war the present 
paper purports to examine the history of the zone of peace process within the Indian Ocean, as it re-
lates to the interests of regional littoral states and extra regional powers entry in the Indian Ocean. 
Further the paper also tries to examine the role and response from these regional and extra regional 
powers in the formation of Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. 
Keywords: Cold War, Geopolitics, Indian Ocean Region, South Asian Nuclear Weapon-
Free Zone, Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, Extra-Regional Powers 
 
Introduction 
The Indian Ocean during the Cold War was turning the sea into a series of militarized geo-
graphy based on shipping lanes, defense areas and strategic chokepoints. As a result maritime per-
ception and policies of the littoral states in the Indian Ocean came to be dominated by the binary 
division of Cold War geopolitics. In this power politics, driven and excessively state centered geo-
political discourse and the policy- making influenced by it, territory and territorial control always 
necessarily implied more power and capability. However, in a classical geopolitical context, it was 
in the ancient Greece period, the application of naval resources to systematic political purposes 
came to be known as 'Thalassocracy' meaning 'maritime supremacy or rule of sea'. The term appears 
to be popularized in Athens, in the fifth Century B.C. (Modelski & Thompson,4-5). Furthermore, 
one of the most influential naval officer, Rear Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840-1914) of U.S.Navy, es-
tablished his reputation as a naval historian and strategist (Gray & Sloan, 37-62). Mahan's idea about 
sea power, which among other things dealt with the inter-connectedness of force, economies and 
geography have prompted considerable discussion of the relationship of his work to geopolitics. The 
Indian Ocean may have passed through many stages in history but the contemporary maritime tradi-
tions can be traced back to imperial powers that was greatly influenced by intra-European power 
politics as reflected in the region. The Cold War geopolitics were not only developing the tech-
niques for placing sensing devices on sea floor but also nuclear and other weapons of mass destruc-
tion in Indian Ocean 
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The Indian Ocean as a Zone of peace (IOZP) has wide ramification as it envisaged by bring-
ing about a new trend in the international developments. It was more or less an extension of the spi-
rit of détente aimed at contributing towards the relaxation of international tension, especially in the 
Indian Ocean. The concept also proposes to dismantle the external imperialistic military bases. 
Hence by implication, it was meant that no external power should ever threaten the independence of 
the littoral states of the IOR. The concept also advocates that the IOR must not be used in future, for 
further interests of the neo-colonialists or for the global policy of war and aggression. The aim of the 
states within the IOR was not imposing restrictions on the maritime activities of any nation both ex-
ternal and regional, which tend to promote international trade and scientific investigations. The 
states of IOR have an immediate reason to feel concerned with the peace in the Indian Ocean to era-
dicate poverty and thereby work for better future. This cannot be achieved in the face of military 
pressure of external powers and enlargement of the regional countries in the military alliance with 
the latter.The concept of peace zone in the Indian ocean thus has vital relevance to the littoral states. 
On the account of their long history of colonialism there was a desire to safeguard their political in-
dependence and achieve economic growth un-interruptedly. For this, sustainable peace in the Indian 
Ocean was an essential precondition.  
The concept of IOZP, broadly speaking included many aspect, like to render Indian Ocean a 
nuclear free zone, to bring to a close the further expansion of military presence of great powers in 
the region, to eradicate the superpower rivalry in the IOR, to resolve political disagreement or ac-
ceptance of arms control restriction among the littoral and hinterland state themselves, to eliminate 
the colonial domination of island (Kumar,2000, 52-55).The proposal for the IOZP should be seen in 
the backdrop of the late 1950s and early 1960s, when the world witnessed many new ideas and ap-
proaches to arms control and peace. It was during the 1960s that the Indian Ocean began to identify 
as an area of superpower confrontation. The geopolitics of oil was the driving force to keep presence 
in securing the safety of sea lanes of communications in Indian Ocean. It was comparatively low 
strategic priority in 1960s, but safeguarding of U.S. oil company investments must have been a 
reckonable factor. By 1960s the deployment of the Strategic Launch of Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs-
Polaris) with their limited range of around 3000 km. made the north quadrant of the Arabian Sea an 
important location to target Southern parts of the Soviet Union as a part of its strategic nuclear 
second strike capability (Bruce, 1993, 205). Both the superpowers, U.S. and USSR introduced naval 
forces on a more or less on permanent basis and sought supporting naval facility from the littoral 
countries. These developments must have caused serious concerns to the regional states and espe-
cially to the Srilanka. The proposal for nuclear free zone in the Indian Ocean numbered notably in 
the resolution passed by the 1970 Lusaka summit of Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and was re-
called in the 1971 General Assembly resolution (Kumar,2000,53). The proposal was initially di-
rected at superpowers, but Srilankan representatives made it clear, renunciation of nuclear weapon 
by including the zonal power in the above arena (Ibid, 2000,102).  
 
Objectives of the Study: 
1. To examine in brief the historical process during Cold war in making Indian Ocean 
as zone of peace. 
2.  To analyse the interests and perspective of regional littoral states within the Indian 
Ocean region. 
3. To understand and examine the role and responses from the regional as well as extra 
regional powers, in the formation of Indian Ocean as a zone of peace.   
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Methodology 
At a conceptual-analytical level, the present research proposes to apply the insights offered 
by what has come to be known as a ‘critical’ perspectives or approaches in political geography and 
geopolitics. What is common to such diverse but critical approaches is that they knock down the 
core elements of classical geopolitics into pieces. The proposed research will be based on data col-
lected from various primary and secondary sources pertaining to government, non-governmental 
organizations and the relevant policy documents, reports, and debates to identify particular ap-
proaches or study to locate Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. 
Theoretical Framework: A Brief Overview  
Locating Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace: Cold War Period 
While defining its position vis-à-vis IOZP, the countries like India, Pakistan, Srilanka, Nepal 
and Maldives also called upon to halt any further escalation of their military presence and to elimi-
nate all bases and other great power competition and moved resolution for making a zone of peace. 
Since its inception, India’s approach towards Indian Ocean was shaped by it’s by its own under-
standing of Indian Ocean. The inference can be drawn from India’s first and foremost maritime 
thinker K.M. Pannikar argument, “While to many other countries, Indian Ocean is only one of the 
important oceanic area, to India its vital sea and her life lines are connected to the sea. There is no 
development possible unless the Indian Ocean is free and her shores are fully protected. The Indian 
Ocean must therefore remain truly Indian” (Panikkar, 1945, 84). 
By the time India has acquired its maritime capacity in the 1960s and 1970s, it started active-
ly opposing the presence of extra regional powers in the Indian Ocean (Garver, 2011, 277). In view 
of this, it was in December 1971, India planned out the passage of a United Nations General Assem-
bly resolution for declaring the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace for further expansion of military 
presence in the Indian Ocean (Ibid, 2011). In the decade of 1980s India started emphasizing on a 
broader geostrategic role with its littoral states in the Indian Ocean especially like Mauritius, Mada-
gascar, the Maldives, Sri Lanka and the Seychelles (Brewster & Rai, 2011, 58-62). 
Whereas, Pakistan initially faced a dilemma being a member of South East Asia Treaty Or-
ganization (SEATO) and Baghdad Pact. It is argued that Islamabad was not clear to the proposal, 
does it mean exclusion of big powers or denuclearization or the induction of the one or more region-
al powers into the policing role (Siddiqui, 1979, 5). This is evident in Pakistan’s understanding of 
IOZP as having been based on four principles; commitment by regional states to conduct mutual re-
lations on the basis of U.N. Charters, establishment of procedure and machinery to secure com-
pliance with U.N. conflict resolution decision in the region, a regional balance of forces; and renun-
ciation of nuclear option by the regional states (Hussain, 1991,154). 
However by the late 70s, Pakistan began to attach equal importance to both the context 
stated earlier (Ibid, 1991).There were some conflicting views from Pakistan regarding the super-
powers presence in the Indian Ocean during the Cold War. Which can be gauged from an interview 
with the BBC correspondent on 26th April 1974, Mr. Bhutto expressed the view that, Pakistan would 
not object to the establishment of an American bases at Diego Garcia. But he added, “While it would 
be ideal for the Indian Ocean to be a zone of peace, small countries could not dictate to the great 
powers” (The Tribune News, 1974, 4).Besides this, there were other side of inconsistent reports that 
the plan to build a U.S. military base in Diego Garcia is a threat to the countries in the Indian Ocean 
area, “says a resolution of the working committee of the, then ruling Pakistan’s People Party (PPP). 
The working committee expressed unanimously that the Indian Ocean should be a peace area”(The 
Times of India News,1974,5). Further, Pakistan made it clear that it accepted the view that big pow-
ers had geostrategic interest in the Indian Ocean that could not be wished away. As one of the Pakis-
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tani representative stated in the first committee: “Denuclearization of Indian Ocean is a worthy ob-
jective, but we can’t ignore the fact that it touches the strategic interests of the great powers” (Gen-
eral Assembly Official Records, A/C.1/28 P.V.1943). 
With such a perception Pakistan’s hopes that presence of great powers in the Indian Ocean  
with divergent interests will inhibit the ambition of any regional power in the region. This was also 
the rationale for Pakistan’s silence on the Anglo-U.S. move to set up base at Diego Garcia. Pakistan 
besides Indonesia and Australia, during the discussion of Ad-hoc committee has urged the adhe-
rence of littoral states to the non-proliferation treaty in order to bring peace in the Indian Ocean ( 
Kumar,2000,53). In a similar manner declaration was adopted at the Lusaka summit that called upon 
all states to consider and respect the IOZP from which great power rivalries and competition, as well 
as bases conceived in the context of such rivalries and competition, either army, navy or air force 
bases are excluded. However, it was made clear that the Indian Ocean should be free from the nuc-
lear weapons (Bruce, 1993, 205). 
In persistence of the scheme Sri Lankan Prime Minister, Mrs. Bandarnaike circulated a paper 
at the Commonwealth summit in January 1971, stating;  
“Recent reports point to an increasing naval presence of the Soviet Union and naval fleets in 
the IOR. It would also appear that these fleets carrying nuclear capability are becoming part of the 
strategic system of the world powers. Another disturbing development is the militarization of the In-
dian Ocean. The same reports indicate that various islands and land based facilities are being uti-
lized to facilitate the operation of these fleets” (Ibid, 1993). 
These developments resulted in Sri Lanka’s Prime Minister Srimavo Bandernaike to intro-
duce in U.N. General Assembly on 16th October 1971 a Resolution no. 2832 on declaration of “In-
dian Ocean as a Zone of Peace” (Ibid, 1993). 
During in May 1974, India successfully conducted its first underground peaceful nuclear ex-
plosion in Pokhran rejecting the Nuclear Proliferation treaty (NPT) on basis of its discriminatory 
nature. This led to considerable anxieties in the region, just as china has done on October 16, 1964. 
This prompted Mr. Amerasinghe to declare in 1975 at the United Nations; 
“We do not want any great power there. By the same token, we do not intend that we should 
drive out Satan by Beelzebub and allow some other powers within the group of littoral and hinter-
land states to take the place of the superpowers”(United Nation Document,1975,155) . 
Accordingly, Sri Lanka’s Prime Minister Srimavo Bandernaike introduced in U.N. General 
Assembly on 16th October 1971, a resolution no. 2832 on declaration of “Indian Ocean as a Zone of 
Peace”. Whereas Pakistan’s preoccupation with regional security or with providing a regional con-
text to the IOZP proposal found its best expression in what Pakistan considered a political option 
against the nuclear threat” posed by the peaceful explosion of nuclear India in May 1974 (Hussain, 
1991, 155). 
 
Results and Discussion 
Proposal for South Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone in South Asia 
It was in the 16th Annual Session of the U.N. Atomic Energy Conference held in Mexico in 
September 1972, Pakistan put forward the proposal to denuclearize South Asia and called for a trea-
ty between South Asian countries similar to the Tlatelolco Treaty for the denuclearization of Latin 
America (Pande, 1999, 1681-1693). Hence the idea of a nuclear weapon-free zone was mooted 
much before two years, the Indian explosion took place. The India’s’ peaceful nuclear explosion 
merely provided Islamabad with an occasion to assert its stand on anxieties regarding its security as 
well as seeking parity with India. This is one of the reasons for most of author’s writings in Pakistan 
 
Sanjeev Kumar Bragta 
 
 
Openly accessible at http://www.european-science.com                                                                      574 
 
on its proposal on nuclear free zone in the light of Pokhran test in 1974(Ahmad,1979, 96 & Khalil-
zad, 1976,546). 
Finally, the commencement of the proposal for a South Asian Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone 
(SANWFZ) was put forth on 28thOctober 1974, the concept was introduced by Pakistan in the First 
Committee of the 29th UN General Assembly for a SANWFZ (The United Nations Year-
book,1974,19-21).Whereas the Pakistani proposal for SANWFZ was considered complimentary to   
the objective of establishing a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean. Further, it was perhaps a realiza-
tion of bleak future for its SANWFZ proposal that has led Islamabad to put forward other peace 
zone variants (Ibid,1974, 155-156). 
Although, there were certain anxieties in Pakistan’s defense establishment regarding the In-
dian naval capability in the IOR that can be gauged from the  comment made by Brig. Noor A. Hus-
sain, who was the Director General of the Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad (IISS), in the 
mid-1970s that India’s Indian Ocean policy seeks regional maritime hegemony under the pretext of 
declaring it a zone of peace to keep other bigger powers out (Hussain,1978) Besides this  to streng-
then further her proposal Pakistan tried to make an efforts to have the support of the South Asian 
neighbours  for the establishment of a NWFZ in the region. The most wholehearted support came 
from Bangladesh. Whereas, Maldives agreed on principles to amend the proposal to make it more 
suitable. In order to move further UN Secretary General after ascertaining the view from the states 
within the region moved the provisional agenda of the 42ndsession, 1987 in accordance with the 
General Assembly resolution 41/49 of the previous year (The United Nation’s Disarmament Year 
Book,1987,215). 
It is also believed that Pakistan put forward many proposals in this regard that were rejected 
by the non-aligned group but it was only in July 1979 that the expansion of the region to include the 
littoral states in the IOZP proposal came to be accepted (Towle, 1981, 208-209). Even after the end 
of First Cold War, considerable hope was generated during the period of détente and it appeared that 
a peace zone in Indian Ocean might yet materialize. Pakistan’s own security perception is reflected 
in its persistent effort to broaden the IOZP proposal so as to include a regional context. For the same 
reason the super power activity in the Indian Ocean were downplayed.  
Extra Regional Powers in the Indian Ocean  
There is no definite time to declare Indian Ocean as Zone of peace, but the very idea clearly 
stemmed out of the general interests of the non-aligned littoral states to protect them from the Cold 
war geopolitics. The British withdrawal from the area in 1968 made a way for the competitive su-
perpowers involvement in the Indian Ocean. The closure of Suez Canal in 1967 and rising impor-
tance of oil from Persian Gulf accelerated the interest of external powers into the region (Buzan, 
1981, 197-198). This transition was coordinated with the US, with a complex chain of regional 
events like prior to 1968, encouraging this handover of power including the 1955 Baghdad Pact, the 
1962 Sino-Indian War, the 1964 Zanzibar Revolution, and the decolonization of East Africa more 
generally led to the  increasingly involved US interests and direct participation (Lee, 2013, 525).  
During Indo-Pak war US sent its seventh fleets in the Bay of Bengal and this also coincided with the 
passage of IOZP resolution. Further in 1974, the pace quickened the US announced plans to expand 
the Diego Garcia facility by upgrading its support functions. By 1980 US had either constructed or 
access to naval facilities across the Indian Ocean region further leading to the militarization of In-
dian Ocean region in this decade. 
Similarly, the Soviet Union had not had an influential presence in the Indian Ocean, but its 
interests equally centered on resources coupled with Cold War geopolitical competition. In 1967, the 
Soviet government publication military strategy included the Indian Ocean region within geostrateg-
ic concerns. In 1968, a flotilla of Soviet naval ships move around the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf 
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regions, bringing to a halt in India, Sri Lanka, Iraq, South Yemen, and Somalia. With the military 
presence and its activity in the region during in 1980s and the presence of Soviet troops in one of the 
hinterland states of the Indian Ocean not only challenged vital western strategic interests, but also 
made a neutralization of the IOZP area and superpower withdrawal from it impossible. 
Though, Indian Ocean has been the low priority basis for the US in comparison to the Atlan-
tic and the Pacific Ocean. Nevertheless, US maintained its naval presence in the Indian Ocean. 
There are different views about the naval presence of US in the Indian Ocean as some holding the 
opinion as the military outpost in the post-colonial era to ascertain their control over the former co-
lonies. While the other holds of view that political instability and change at regional level in the In-
dian Ocean may tilt the balance of power in favour of the Soviet Union or the China. The Washing-
ton tried to maintain the status quo, more importantly it was providing billions of dollars as econom-
ic and military assistance to the countries of the littoral states of the Indian Ocean region to prevent 
them from being part of the communist regime                              (Gupta,1987,195). Further US pol-
icy was driven by its protection of Sea lanes of communication for flowing its trade from Persian 
Gulf. 
Despite of various peace zone plans made by superpowers, as on 9th March 1977, President 
Carter made a proposal at a news conference for the demilitarization of the Indian Ocean by mutual 
military restraint with Soviet Union.  Similarly, the Soviet Premier Kosygin responded to it positive-
ly on 24th March 1977. By June it appeared as if considerable progress has been made. A third round 
of talks between the U.S. and Soviet Union took place at Berne, Switzerland in December 1977, 
which seemed to have positive impact (Subramanyam, 1989,231). It was quite apparent that any 
agreement between the superpower on the Indian Ocean would be based on their respective global 
geostrategic perceptions. The situation suddenly deteriorated with the soviet Invasion of Afghanis-
tan and sudden overthrow of the Shah of Iran by a hostile Islamic fundamentalist regime, which bas-
ically altered the situation in the IOR (Towle,1981,212). By the late 1980’s the U.S. had deployed 
seven pre-positional ships at Diego Garcia, increased the naval presence in the Arabian Sea from 
one to two carrier battle groups and requested additional funds for enhancing the projection capabili-
ty of the Rapid Development Force (RDF). These developments put a final stop to all efforts at 
creating an IOZP. 
Besides these, the other set of proposals, were made to make the zone of peace in the IOR 
like the Indian Ocean Conference of left-wing movements in April 1978, which had focused on de-
militarizing the Indian Ocean, had provoked the wrath of the superpowers bent on dominating the 
region and imperialism proceeded to recruit counter revolutionaries to plot an overthrow of the pro-
gressive government of President Rene` (Seychelles). Their aim was to create puppet regimes 
throughout the IOR (Prescott,1985,179). There were also certain resolutions introduced in related to 
nuclear weapon free Zones in the Indian Ocean, but hardly any consensus was evolved.     
As far as China is concerned, there is certain evidences that China’s view about zone of 
peace and nuclear free was directed against the two superpowers expansion of nuclearisation in the 
Indian Ocean. The 13 States draft of the Afro-Asian resolution was considered by the China as ur-
gent desire “to oppose the superpowers contention for the hegemony and division of sphere of influ-
ence in the Indian Ocean Region”(Jain,1974,1-9). However, China interprets the purpose and objec-
tive of the 1971 Afro-Asian draft resolutions in U.N. their own way and subject to their reservations. 
However the main focus of Chinese attack was the Soviet Union. Though Beijing lashes out against 
both superpowers and it was very difficult to discern. But china’s approach to the peace in the In-
dian Ocean and nuclear free gives us an impression being one side of the Afro-Asian countries and 
at the same considerably helps its struggle against the superpowers and the expansion of its naval 
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activity in the Indian ocean whenever necessary. It was like Beijing stands to gain the either way 
(Ibid, 1974). 
 
Conclusion 
Relatively speaking, the consideration of Indian Ocean as a theatre of military conflict needs 
to be understood in the regional as well as global context through the course of history in the process 
of decolonization to the end of cold war. The very idea of Indian Ocean as a zone of peace reflected 
the genuine concern of littoral states to the presence and Cold War rivalries of superpowers during 
this period. Even the response and role of the littoral states were having common viewpoint on mak-
ing Indian Ocean as a zone of pace but were having contested orientations in relation to the presence 
of superpowers in the Indian Ocean. Despite of détente during cold war, Indian Ocean became geo-
strategically important and new arms race started in the 80s with two big powers US and USSR vy-
ing for the regional influence in the region. 
There is no denying about the fact that most of the regional as well as extra regional, mari-
time powers in the Indian Ocean region have long- term interests. It appears to be  inconceivable 
that is going to erode their vital access  of naval wing as most of these like  Western Europe, US, 
China and Soviet Union and others depends on navigational routes across the Indian Ocean region 
for trading and commerce. Thus in order to protect their interests and safeguard sea lanes of com-
munications and geostrategic character of Indian Ocean further addition to the new law of the sea in 
1982 led to the inconsistencies with the proposal for the IOZP during the Cold war and needs to be 
addressed in the Post-Cold war era. At the same time there is an urgency to make Indian Ocean re-
gion more sustainable by development of its economy, environment and facilitating an egalitarian 
society, despite of the challenges within the present century. Indian Ocean continues to create a con-
tested maritime space even today with the   geography of contact, exchange, and politics both re-
gional and at global level-a phenomenon of the past and present that in the same way foreshadows 
of the future. 
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